With Turkish capital markets closed for a week-long holiday, traders expected last week’s Turkish Lira fireworks to remain subdued. And yet, after closing for trading at around 6.00 last Friday, the Lira has resumed its drop, and was trading as low as 6.20 against the dollar after an unknown driver fired shots at the US embassy in Ankara (nobody was hurt), and a report from the WSJ that the US has rebuffed all possibility of negotiations over the release of pastor Brunson.

And according to a new report from SocGen analyst Phoenix Kalen, today’s drop may be just the start of the latest sharp slide in the Turkish currency, one which will eventually see the lira drop to 7.0 by the end of the third quarter, then tumbled as low as 8 by the end of the year, before regaining some ground back to 7.0 by the end of the first half of 2019.

Kalen first lays the underlying drivers for Turkish asset deterioration as follows: overly-loose monetary policy, market participants perceiving a lack of central banking independence/credibility, a deteriorating fiscal stance, a large current account deficit that is financed by short-term flows, and an ongoing eastward political shift.

Seeing little hope that any of these adverse catalysts will change in the near future, SocGen sees Turkey engaged in a protracted trudge “toward the brink of a financial crisis“. Furthermore, the French bank no longer expects an imminent substantial interest rate hike by the CBRT before its 13 September MPC meeting. Meanwhile, as Turkey-US diplomatic relations have deteriorated, focusing the public’s attention on Erdogan’s nationalistic agenda, Turkish policymakers are taking short-term measures to address financial stability by attacking short sellers and market liquidity without tackling macroeconomic and monetary policy imbalances.

The punchline: SocGen sees USDTRY trading up to 8.0 before reaching the “pain threshold that compels Turkey to compromise on some of its strategic objectives.” In other words for Erdogan to fold in the diplomatic war with trump, the lira will have to plunge to a new record low.

Digging into the report, in its assessment of the likely scenarios for how Turkish authorities will respond to the country’s challenges in the coming months, Kalen lays out three possible scenarios, of which the most likely one (55%) is that the nation continues on its protracted trudge toward a financial crisis, with the resulting financial stress eventually prompting capitulation. And while there is a modest probability for the worst-case scenario, SocGen also sees an outcome in which Turkey “descends into economic and financial crisis” with the USDTRY climbing to 9.0.

Here are the details via SocGen:

55% probability (base case): Protracted trudge toward the brink of financial crisis.

  • Turkey-US tensions escalate. We believe the Turkish authorities will take the lead from the country’s president, who may be unwilling to relent in the very near term on the diplomatic / foreign policy front. The rift between Turkey and the US may continue to widen, amidst escalating rounds of sanctions, threats, and retaliatory responses. (In this context, a Turkish appeals court rejected the application to release Pastor Brunson on Friday, 17 August, which could prompt another round of US sanctions against Turkey.)
  • Stumbling toward financial crisis, before turning back from the brink. Although Turkey may be able to piece together sufficient financial assistance from its closest allies to meet financing needs over the short term, under this scenario, depreciation pressure on Turkish assets would return forcefully. In particular, the CBRT’s unwillingness to shift the interest rate policy corridor higher could exacerbate weakness in TRY. Under this updated base case scenario, we no longer expect an imminent substantial interest rate hike by the CBRT before its 13 September MPC meeting. Indeed, the central bank has displayed an increased willingness to wait out higher CPI readings while observing the impact of ongoing economic rebalancing, (or alternatively, is politically constrained from tightening policy). GDP growth would slow significantly, but the country would not enter a recession.
  • Financial stress eventually compels capitulation. We anticipate that over a period of several months, renewed banking sector stress, the growing need to recapitalize troubled banks, mounting NPLs arising from higher corporate FX debt burden, difficulties for corporates to access external markets, and a decrease of the Turkish population’s confidence in the lira may put so much internal pressure on President Erdo?an that he is compelled to go back to the negotiating table. This could in turn lead to diplomatic concessions with the US and efforts to repair the relationship. Post that turning point, a gradual recovery in TRY-denominated assets could follow